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In the Court

Appeals

O F T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O L U M B IA
O ctober T e r m ,

1922.

No. 3870.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED PUB
LIC ACCOUNTANTS, A CORPORATION, AP
PELLANT,
vs.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

B R IE F F O R A P P E L L A N T .

TRACY L. JEFFORDS,
EDWIN C. DUTTON,
Attorneys for Appellant.

TH E LAW REPORTER PRINTING COMPANY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

In the Court of Appeals
O F T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA .
O ctober T er m ,

1922.

No. 3870.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED PUB
LIC ACCOUNTANTS, A CORPORATION, AP
PELLANT,
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

B R IE F F O R A P P E L L A N T .

TRACY L. JEFFORDS,
EDWIN C. DUTTON,
A tto rn e y s f o r A p p e lla n t.

TH E LAW REPORTER PRINTING COMPANY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

In the Court of Appeals
O F T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O L U M B IA .
O ctober T erm , 1922.

No. 3870.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED PUB
LIC ACCOUNTANTS, A CORPORATION, AP
PELLANT,
vs.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Statement of Case.

The United States by its attorney for the District of
Columbia filed under sec. 793 of the Code a bill against
appellant, a corporation, under sec. 599 of the Code.
The bill alleged that appellant was holding itself
out as empowered to issue degrees or certificates, with
out any authority of law, in an utterly careless manner,
and against the public policy of the District of Columbia.
The bill alleges appellant issued to an applicant in Vir
ginia one of its certificates but does not allege anything
wrong or unlawful about this.
The bill further alleges that certain persons in Cali
fornia perpetrated a fraud on appellant by giving
fictitious names and recommndations and appellant
issued one of its certificates in the fictitious name of an
applicant for same.
The bill alleges that appellant issued one of its certi
ficates to a person in Kentucky, “in a manner derogatory
to the public interests of the State of Kentucky.’’
8906— 1 .
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On filing the bill, rule to show cause was issued and
for return appellant moved to dismiss and was over
ruled, and preliminary injunction was granted.
Appellant answered and moved to dissolve injunction,
and appellee moved to strike out answer and for a decree
pro confesso.
Court overruled motion to dissolve, made no decree
pro confesso, but a final decree permanently enjoining
appellant from making any use of its charter. Appellant
duly excepted and appealed.
The provisions of the charter of appellant in exact
words, permit it to do what it was doing, but notwith
standing said charter provisions, appellee contends that
appellant was doing what is “not by law allowed to be as
sumed or exercised by said corporation.”
Sec. 575 of the Code in relation to incorporating—
“Institutions of Learning”

provides they are empowered to confer academical or
honorary degrees such as are conferred by similar
institutions.
Sec. 599 of the Code under which appellant is incorpor
ated provides for incorporating—
“Societies, Benevolent, Educational and So Forth.”

First mentioned requires five incorporators, second re
quires three, and appellant was incorporated with four.

ARGUMENT.

Appellee can maintain this action only under the pro
visions in the Code authorizing the same which are either
that appellant was doing something not allowed by its
charter, or doing something not allowed by law, but the
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charter expressly provides that appellant may do exactly
what it was doing, and therefore the only ground on
which this action can be maintained is that appellant
was doing something not allowed by law to be assumed
or exercised by it (Code, D. C., 793).
The bill alleges that appellant was acting in an utterly
careless manner, in a manner derogatory to the public
interests of the State of Kentucky; against the public
policy of the District of Columbia, and without au
thority of law.
As a matter of fact, appellant had not done anything
in an utterly careless manner, and what it had done, if
done in that way, would not be a violation of law. This
is not a law action for damages for negligence.
As a matter of fact appellant has not done anything
in a manner derogatory to the public interests of the
State of Kentucky, and as a matter of law it can not do
anything in the District of Columbia in a manner deroga
tory to the public interests of the State of Kentucky.
District of Columbia is created by Congress—“a gov
ernment—a body corporate, for municipal purposes,”
and it has no public policy in the ordinary acceptance
and understanding of that expression, and none defined
by any law or otherwise, and the bill makes no allega
tion as to what such policy is, or how appellant has
offended against it.
Degree as used by appellant is not an academic
or honorary degree such as is conferred by institu
tions of learning, and the attainments of a person
expert in accounting do not entitle him to an academic or
honorary degree such as are conferred by institutions of
learning.
There are degrees of temperature, degrees in mathe
matics, degrees of offenses, density, etc., etc., degrees of
lodges, societies and organizations, but the distinctions
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between these and the degrees conferred by institutions
of learning are well-known and well understood, and
the only meaning or use of the word degree that has
any place in this litigation is a c a d e m ic a l or h o n o ra ry , such
as are conferred by institutions of learning.
Institutions of learning have been defined by our Court
of Appeals as follows:
“ Those organizations of a permanent nature
wherein the higher branches of education only are
those in which instruction is given.”
U. S. ex rel. Chicago Business College vs.
Payne, 20 App. D. C., 606.
There are no allegations in the bill that appellant is
such an institution as the Court of Appeals defines in its
above cited definition, and there is no word of proof to
show it to be such an institution and for that reason
alone the decree from which appeal is taken herein should
be reversed.
If there be nothing to show appellant within that
definition there is nothing in this case on which to
justify affirming the trial court.
So far as appellant has been able to learn no such
institution confers the degree of certified public ac
countant and the first use of the word degree in that con
nection was made by appellant and it was and is a
degree in name only, and not such as is contemplated
by our local statute (Code, sec. 575).
Appellee contends that because appellant used the
word degree in its certificate it was doing what can be
done only by an institution of learning, and that being
incorporated under section 599 and having but four in
corporators it is not an institution of learning, and was
violating the law.
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Articles of incorporation of appellant provide its
purposes are:
“ To bring together in one common union
certified public accountants who are now, or
heretofore have been, engaged in the practice
of professional accounting; also, those who, by
virtue of education, personal endowments, tech
nical training and experience are qualified to per
form the duties pertaining to professional ac
counting; to provide for the admission of mem
bers, and when said members shall have pre
sented satisfactory evidence of knowledge in
the theory and practice of accounting, and
shall have satisfactorily passed the prescribed
qualifying examination of the association to
admit said members to the degree of certi
fied public accountant, and to issue to such
members the Association’s formal certificate to
that degree pertaining, to safeguard the rightful
professional interests and promote the friendly,
and social, and public relations of the members
of this corporation; and to do all else incident,
appurtenant, and germane to the purposes and
objects of this corporation” (Rec., p. 8).
Body of certificate issued by appellant is as follows:
“ Be it known that______________________
having presented satisfactory evidence as to his
knowledge of the Theory, Science, and Practice of
Accountancy, or having passed the prescribed
examination is hereby admitted to Membership
in this Association, and upon him is conferred
the Degree of Certified Public Accountant and
as such is entitled to all the honors, rights, and
privileges to that Degree appertaining (Rec., p.
15).
Contention of appellee was adopted by the court,
and appellant’s answer was struck out on the theory
that so long as appellant admitted being incorporated
under Section 599, it could not have any defense in
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this case, and therefore decree should be rendered against
it as by default, but neither court or counsel have
suggested under what law or practice it is permissible
to strike out an answer as in this case was done.
The court has decreed against the appellant on the
theory that the word degree as used by appellant con
stituted a violation of law in contemplation of the
following mentioned considerations:
(a) The court, without any testimony, found as a
fact that appellant conferred the degree of certified
public accountant in its certificate of membership.
(b) That the degree of certified public accountant is
an academic or honorary degree such as are conferred
by institutions of learning.
(c) That appellant is not an institution of learning.
On these findings of fact, without any testimony, the
court held as a matter of law, that appellant was doing
what is "not by law allowed to be assumed or exercised
by said corporation.”
“ Degree” is any academic rank recognized by colleges
and universities having a reputable character as institu
tions of learning, or any form of expression composed in
whole or in part of words recognized as indicative of
academic rank, alone or in combination with other
words, so that there is conveyed to the ordinary mind
the idea of some collegiate or university or scholastic
distinction.
Commonwealth vs. New England College of
Chiropractic, 221 Mass., 190.
In this chiropractic case, discussing degrees, the
Massachusetts court say, that if the evidence was
believed, it warranted a finding by the jury that doctor
of chiropractic was treated as a degree, but the testimony
in the case showed it was conferred similar to the

7

conferring of degrees by colleges or universities at
commencement.
And further: “ There are three general grades of such
degrees: namely, Bachelor, Master, Doctor.”
And further degree “ signifies an academic dis
tinction,” and includes whatever p ro p e rly may be
d escrib ed as a degree.
What is a degree depends on what is described as
such, and depends on facts and circumstances on
proof of how the word is sued, by whom, and under
what circumstances.
No authority has been suggested as a basis for sus
taining the contention of appellee and the decree of
the court.
If the court passed upon the whole case its decree
was so apparently an error that there is no need of
argument to show that, but having struck out the
answer there is left no room for it to be considered as
sufficient or not sufficient to answer or swear away the
allegations of the bill and entitle appellant to be heard on
the merits of the case.
And all that is beside the question and unnecessary
to be considered, if this court takes the view of the
case which appellee and the trial court took of it, that
no matter what the pleadings may show as to what
was done, or was not done, or when, or where, or how
anything was done by appellent, the sole question is
as to the use by appellant of the word degree, and
that same may be rightly determined in this case as a
matter of law, without testimony as to facts and cir
cumstances of the case, and without giving appellant
its day in court to show the facts.
Before this court should affirm the trial court it
must go further and hold that the trial court was right
as to procedure in doing what it has done, and right in its
decision as to the use of the word degree by appellant
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and th at it was doing what is “ not by law allowed to be
assumed or exercised by said corporation.”
It must be conceded that appellant, by issuing certifi
cates in the form they were issued, was not exercising
any franchise, liberty or privilege or transacting any
business not allowed by its charter or certificate of in
corporation, for the record shows that the certificate of
incorporation expressly gave it the privilege of issuing
its certificates in the exact words in which they were
issued, and such form is here complained about by the
United States through the District Attorney. This certi
ficate of incorporation is a contract between the United
States and the corporation, and in issuing its certificates
in the manner and form in which they were issued the
corporation was doing exactly that which by virtue of its
contract with the United States it had the right to do.
This narrows the controversy to the only other provi
sion of Section 793 of our Code under which this action
might be maintained, that is to say, that appellant is
exercising a franchise, liberty or privilege or transacting
business not by law allowed to be assumed or exercised
by said corporation. What is the franchise, liberty, privi
lege or business being done by this corporation which is
not by law allowed to be done? This seems to us to be the
only question involved in this cause. The real complaint
alleged in the bill is that appellant is issuing degrees,
which, while allowed by the contract between the United
States and appellant, are yet not allowed by law because
only institutions of learning can issue degrees, and appel
lant is not an institution of learning. We say that the
word degree as used in the certificates issued by appellant
is not such a degree as comes within the provisions of
Section 575 of the Code, and is neither academical or
honorary, and that the form of certificate is therefore
legal and proper and that appellant has a legal right to
issue certificates in the form in which they were being
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issued and in so doing controverts no law of the District
of Columbia.
Appellant contends that whether or not this use of the
word degree constituted a violation of law, whether or
not appellant is an institution of learning, whether or
not the use of this word degree in the certificates of
appellant constitutes conferring an academical or honor
ary degree such as are conferred by institutions of
learning all depend on facts and circumstances, and that
appellant had a right to be heard as to same.
Appellant further contends that striking out the an
swer and passing final decree as was done in this case is
without authority or justification in law or equity, or
good conscience.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court should
be reversed.
TRACY L. JEFFORDS,
EDWIN C. DUTTON,
A tto rn e y s f o r A p p e lla n t.

